A paper submitted to the Faculty on May 30, 2018.
The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views.
Introduction.
Due to the wealth of natural resources in the South China Sea, a number of aggressive acts were perpetrated by countries bordering the region to legitimize any territory claimed for ownership. The claims were based on historical factors, economic calculations and geostrategic considerations of the countries involved. Indonesia is one of the countries in Southeast Asia that is not directly involved in the conflict of territorial seizure in the South China Sea. However, Southeast Asia is a strategic area for Indonesia which has a number of regional potentialities within the Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN) membership. In short, if regional stability within ASEAN is threatened by disputes in the South China Sea region, it will have an impact on non-conformance to ASEAN's credibility and security posture that will affect Indonesia.
One of the key issues that is dynamically growing with the advancement of the Asia-Pacific region is the security issue in the South China Sea (SCS). Some ASEAN countries involved in the conflict in the South China Sea with China are Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. There are several initiatives that have already taken aim to solve or at lease to relaxing the tension among the claimant state through ASEAN. For instance, at the initiative of Indonesia, on 17 October 2012, the Governments of the Member States of ASEAN and the Government of the People’s Republic of China have signed the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea.[1]The latest issue is as China initiative wherein ASEAN and China will have joint military drill codenamed “the 1stASEAN-China Joint Maritime Exercise”.China is keen to have the Joint Military Drills with ASEAN since 2015, but some of ASEAN members objected, in particularly for claimants’ states as China wanted them conducted in the South China Sea (SCS) where there are overlapping claims. While at the 12thASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ASEAN-China Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting on 5-7 February 2018 in Singapore, most likely ASEAN member states welcomed the conduct of an inaugural joint maritime exercise at the end of this year.[2]
This joint maritime exercise contains not only a strategic value for Indonesia but also has a beneficial effect for Indonesia Navy (IDN) at the operational level as an instrument to implement government policies and protect all government interests in the maritime domain. Therefore, in the beginning, this paper will assess three main positive points that the Indonesian Navy might gain by joining this exercise. Firstly, aligning with the national perspective which states that there is generally no issues at the strategic level of the relationship between Indonesia and China. Secondly, this exercise is the way to conduct a naval diplomacy role adopted from Ken Booth’s theoryand amended in Global Maritime Fulcrum as Indonesia’s vision that one of the five pillars are intensifying Indonesia’s maritime diplomacy. And finally, this exercise will be shaping the operational framework bilaterally by strengthening IDN and People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ties to find a good form of engagement in the future and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) development including better confidence-building and information sharing. Then followed by the unfavorable effect that Indonesia Navy might have and concludes with rebuttal and suggestions of the concept and several issues of upcoming exercise might take to put forward the good order at sea.
Aligning with National Perspective.
Indonesia is not a claimant state. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) region, in particular, the dispute over ownership of the Spartly Islands and the Paracel Islands have a long history of conflict. History shows that, the mastery of the Archipelago has involved many countries including England, France, Japan, China, Vietnam, which then involves the islands of Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, and Taiwan. Territorial disputes and control of the Islands in the SCS, preceded by Chinese demands on all the islands of the SCS region that refer to historical records, site discovery, ancient documents, maps and the use of island clusters by fishermen. According to China, since 2000 years ago, the SCS has become a shipping lane for them. Beijing asserts the first to find and occupy the Spartly Islands is China, supported by Chinese archeological evidence from the Han Dynasty (206-220 BCE)[3]. But Vietnam denied it and considers Spartly and Paracel Islands are part of its sovereign territory. Vietnam mentions the Spartly and Paracel Islands effectively occupied since the 17th century when the two Islands were not in control of a country[4].
In its development, Vietnam did not recognize China's sovereign territory in the region, so that when World War II ended South Vietnam occupied the Paracel Islands, including some island clusters in the Spartly Islands. In addition to South Vietnam, the Spartly Islands are also occupied by Taiwan (since World War II and the Philippines (1971).While the Philippines occupied a group of island clusters in the eastern Spartly Islands called Kalayaan[5]and then occupied the Panata Island cluster in 1978. The reason the Philippines occupies the area is because it is a land not owned by any country (empty). The Philippines, which refers to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Accords, in which one of its contents stated that Japan had waived its right to the Spartly Islands, and subsequently submitted to the designated country.
Malaysia also occupied several clusters of the Spartly Islands, named after the Swallow Reef. According to Malaysia, the move was taken based on the Malaysian Continental Shelf Boundary Map 1979, covering parts of the Spartly islands. Two other clusters of islands also claimed Malaysia as its territory namely Commodore Reef occupied by the Philippines and Amboyna Cay occupied Vietnam.[6]Meanwhile, Brunei Darussalam, which gained full independence from Britain on January 1, 1984, later also claimed territory in the Spartly Islands. However, Brunei claims only waters and not island clusters.[7]
Indonesia is not recognizing Nine-Dashed Line and Historic Rights at the South China Sea. The UNCLOS has generally allocated the rights of a state in the maritime zone and the protection of pre-existing rights to natural resources, but that right is not specifically adopted in the Convention. Based on this, although China has a historical right to resources in the South China Sea but its rights disappeared because it is inconsistent with the rights in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) contained in the Convention. It should also be noted that Chinese fishermen and seafarers, as well as fishermen and other sailors, have a history of island use in the South China Sea. Indonesia concluded there was no legal basis for China to claim historical rights over natural resources in nine-dashed lines.
The Indonesian government has rejected China's claim to the nine-dashed line and expressly views the claim as "non-existent", conducted through protests in 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2012. In addition, Indonesia has also already submitted to the UN Secretary-General on 8 July 2010 through diplomatic note stating that the 9-dashed line map is "Clearly Lacks International Legal Basis"[8]. Then, the Indonesian President, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, during a visit to Japan in an interview with local media in March 2015, again stated and emphasized that China's claim to the nine-dashed lines has no basis in international law.
China is an important partner of Indonesia. The relationship between Indonesia and China is one of the most important relations, both for Indonesia and for China itself. The relationship between the two countries has begun centuries ago. Indonesia is part of the maritime path of the Silk Road connecting China with India and the Middle East. Indonesia and China are the major economies among Asian countries in terms of territory and population. China is the most populous country in the world, while Indonesia has the fourth largest population in the world. Indonesia and China are the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) members; an economic forum of 21 nations in the Asia-Pacific region to strengthening communities, economic growth and accelerating regional economic integration across Pacific Rim[9]; and major economies of the G-20. The G-20 or Group of 20 major economies is a group of 19 countries with the world's largest economy plus the European Union (EU).[10]
Geographically, Indonesia positions very strategically in the Asia Pacific and Malacca Straits. While economically, Indonesia is a very rich country with natural resources and minerals, both on land and at sea. Indonesia's extraordinary natural wealth is obviously very tempting to the advanced industrial countries today like China to manipulate it, whether directly or indirectly. Moreover, with a population of more than 243 million people, Indonesia is a potential market for products of industrialized countries. Bilateral relations between Indonesia and China, especially in the current economic field continues to increase. This is evident from the increase in trade value between Indonesia and China in 2008 which reached US $ 27 billion[11]. In the next five years, the President of the Republic of Indonesia (RI) estimates the value of Indonesia-China trade will reach US $ 50 billion. The increase in bilateral relations, expressed by the Ambassador of China, is inseparable from the establishment of Free Trade ASEAN-China (FTAC)[12].
On Sunday, 14 May 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Indonesian President Joko Widodo in Beijing. The meeting was held after the opening of The Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF). President Joko Widodo is convinced that the development of One Belt One Road (OBOR) will bring more opportunities to the relationship of Indonesia-China economic cooperation. Indonesia is willing to deepen its cooperation with China within the framework of OBOR, particularly in the economic, trade and investment sectors, in order to deepen inter-community exchanges. Indonesia is willing to strengthen communication and coordination with China in international and regional affairs and encourage China-ASEAN relations to develop stability.[13]
As mentioned above, there are no big issues at the strategic level in term of the relationship between Indonesia and China. The bilateral cooperation between Indonesia and China is an idealistic and a dynamic diplomatic relationship. This sustainable relationship still needs to be supported by both countries, and should be adopted and break downing into operational framework of bilateral cooperation in various areas between Indonesian Navy (IDN) and People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) based on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in order towards Indonesia Vision: Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF), support Indonesia national policy and to protect its interest. By participating in upcoming the 1st ASEAN-China Joint Maritime Exercise, it is aligning with the national perspective and one of a derivative form at the operational level from a predetermined national policy and strongly believed that there are many advantages of this exercise, thus creating a dynamic bilateral relationship.
Naval Diplomacy Role.
Today, as the world’s center of gravity has shifted from the west to Asia, the desire to rekindle Indonesia’s maritime spirit is strong. This aspiration is manifested in Indonesia’s vision: the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) concept and supported by the five maritime pillars, which are;
1. Rebuilding Indonesia’s maritime culture,
2. Better management of Indonesia’s maritime resources,
3. Development of Indonesia’s maritime infrastructure and connectivity,
4. Intensifying Indonesia’s maritime diplomacy, and
5. Strengthening Indonesia’s maritime defense forces.
This concept is the foundation of Indonesia’s national development. President Joko Widodo announced the GMF concept and its pillars during the 2014 east Asia summit in Naypyidaw, Myanmar.[14]
The term of Maritime Diplomacy that meant by the fourth pillar is a term applicable to various activities in maritime environment that the main actor is the Navy of the sovereign state. In the peace time, maritime diplomacy is conducted to influence the behavior of other countries in the context of interactions and transactions that occur in the maritime domain to have a deterrence effect. Another point is also mentioned that maritime diplomacy is equated with gun boat diplomacy or naval diplomacy.
Ken Booth says, universally the navy has three roles, namely, as a military force, diplomacy force, and constabulary forces.[15] The three roles are synergized and complementary in every military operation held to maintain the stability of maritime security. The role of the military is shaped because of the character of militancy as the armed forces, the role of diplomacy as it carries out the political objectives of the state and the constabulary role relating to the enforcement of national law and ratified international law and the protection of the territorial sovereignty and natural resources contained therein. This explanation reinforces the notion that naval formation should be qualitatively capable of carrying out the universal role.
Based on the vision of government and theory presented above, in this exercise which will be followed by all ASEAN members in 10 countries plus China and as one of the biggest navy in Southeast Asia[16], this is the right time to carry out the role of diplomacy. The Indonesian Navy must be able to show strength, ability, and professionalism in this activity to get the deterrence effects of all participants. In addition to getting the deterrence effects, the navy should also be able to establish cooperation, interoperability and build trust with participating countries to minimize friction-friction that may occur in the future.
Shaping Operational Framework.
Navy To Navy Ties. The IDN and PLAN relationship officially established in Beijing on 27 February 2013 is marked by a discussion forum called Navy To Navy Cooperation Talks (NTNCT)[17]. In this forum is discussed the cooperation plan in the term of Operation and Exercise as well as in the field of Education and Training. Each party submits an offering and a program to be implemented in the future. On this occasion, each party submits annual work program preparation procedures, in the hope that each party understands the time limits required when sending/ offering an invitation/ program to the counterpart. NTNCT is held every two years with the host is made in a rotation and for the next will be held in Jakarta on 2019.
I believe that this exercise can be a stepping stone to strengthen the bilateral relations of the two navies in formulating cooperation and shaping the operational framework of the exercise and training sectors. Both parties may explore the capabilities and limitations that will be used to make good formulations in the future within the framework of bilateral exercises. IDN and PLAN have not yet had any form of bilateral exercise and training so far, very significantly different from the relationship between IDN and United State Navy (USN) which has more than 20 activities in the field of exercises and training in one year[18]or IDN with Royal Australian Navy (RAN) which is almost 8 activities in one year[19]. In addition, IDN can also welcome the Chinese initiative in this exercise as a form of reciprocity from the active role of the PLAN in any multilateral activity or practice initiated by IDN. Recently PLAN has confirmed that they will send their warship and actively participate in the 3rd Multilateral Navy Exercise Komodo (3rdMNEK) activity in Lombok, Indonesia which will be held on 4-9 May 2018 along with 43 other countries and more than 4000 seamen to be involved with theme of “Cooperation to Respond to Disaster and Humanitarian Issues”.[20]
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Development.The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is defining Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) as the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment.Indonesia's national interest in and by sea within the MDA perspective is an indisputable fact that in the future border issues and international trade and transport activities through the Sea Lane of Communication (SLOC) and Sea Lane of Trade (SLOT) in the waters of Southeast Asia will keep on increasing and moving fast. The importance of waters in the region is reflected in part by the high growth of the commercial shipping fleet, the increased seaborne trade, the exploration of biological and non-living natural resources at sea, and the international community's insistence on increasing maritime security in maritime areas international crossing the sovereignty of the Indonesian state.
I do agree that the Asia-Pacific countries are facing the challenges of maritime security both globally and regionally that need to be addressed through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. As an important force in safeguarding maritime security in the Asia Pacific region, the two navies, IDN and PLAN are expected to enhance cooperation and understanding on safeguarding regional peace and stability, addressing traditional and non-traditional threats and ensuring international sea lane security. Both parties should be able to strengthen communication on the mechanisms of bilateral and multilateral security cooperation and together make a significant impact on regional maritime security issues. The more engagement (training and exercise) we perform with other countries (especially PLAN) it will be better in Confidence-Building Measure (CBM)[21]and in particularly this exercise can also be used as a forum for information exchange or intelligence sharing in order to develop and equate the perception of maritime domain awareness whose ultimate goal is to control the risks of actual conflict.
Counter Argument.
Indonesia's initiative to solve or at lease to relax the tension among the claimant state through the Declaration on the Conduct (DoC) of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002 is working well and effectively. It is an important breakthrough implemented by ASEAN member countries and China, but in its development, the Chinese claim that passes through the Indonesian EEZ make compromises sovereign rights and Indonesia's national interests. Prominent events in 2016 in the South China Sea in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Indonesia, especially in North - East Natuna Island or North Natuna Sea have occurred several times related to the presence of Chinese fishing vessels carrying out fishing activities escorted by Chinese Coast Guard vessels. For instance, March 19, 2016, the Chinese Coast Guard ships forced Indonesian authorities to release the Chinese fishing vessel (MV. Kway Fey) that captured when conducted fishing ground violation at Indonesia’s EEZ.[22]
It appears that the conflict in the South China Sea region has a fairly high complexity and involves Indonesia and many parties associated with sovereignty sensitive motives. The use of Traditional Fishing Ground terminology is often used by China especially when Chinese fishing boats are captured by law enforcement officers in Indonesia EEZ. The terminology of Traditional Fishing Ground is not legally found in UNCLOS 1982 as a reference to the international law of the sea. Currently, traditional fishing rights are only used by Indonesia-Malaysia through prior agreements by both countries by observing UNCLOS 1982 article 51[23]. Thus some people might say that coming up the 1stASEAN-China Joint Maritime Exercise has an unfavorable effect for the Indonesian Navy since there is still no solving for the sovereignty sensitivities problem between China and Indonesia in North Natuna Sea and the South China Sea. So far, the Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) that has established a concrete cooperation project, in marine science, the environment to maritime security studies through DoC not able to fully address some problem that happens in the recent time.
Rebuttal.
However, from a Navy perspective, this sovereignty sensitivities problem can not be solved by using the military role, but it would be more advantageous if resolved by the diplomacy role which is in line with the government's view. One of the diplomacy roles that can be done is by following this kind of joint maritime exercise. Furthermore, Indonesian Navy will build and gain the trust of the international community. Trust from the international community can be gained as a consequence of active participation and involvement in regional and international scope activities such as maritime security operations, multilateral exercises and other confidence-building measures activities. Afterward, improving the bargaining position of the state in various efforts to resolve regional and international issues as an integral part of government diplomacy and the implementation of foreign policy. And at the end, Indonesian Navy can secure national interests inside and outside the region.
Conclusion and Suggestion.
Finally, although Indonesia is not claimant state, but several maritime frictions happened between Indonesian and China in period 2010 to 2016. Thus, Indonesia should pay close attention to this sensitive issue carefully and continue to put forward the good order at sea.And Indonesia should approve and support all decision taken by ASEAN member countries. Nevertheless, as the biggest maritime country in South East Asia and ranks number ten in the world’s largest navy[24], Indonesia should play an active role in giving input, ideas, and suggestions in the implementation of the exercise in order to build the confidence and help control the risk between ASEAN and China, moreover to uphold and safeguard Indonesia sovereignty and sovereign rights based on International law.
From the perspective of the Indonesian Navy as a state’s instrument and an operational point of view, there are several points that can be suggested during the planning process until the execution of the exercise in order to continue implementation of the national policy that mandated by the constitution. Those points are as follows:
1. Put forward the spirit of Good Order At Sea. (United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea/ UNCLOS, The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea/ CUES, Code of Conduct/ CoC, etc).
IDN can suggest the possibility of applying CoC like kind of Incident at Sea Agreement (INCSEA)[25]in the SCS. Initially, the process of negotiating the formulation of INCSEA is very tough because of the fragility of CBM between the US and USSR. Nevertheless, both countries determined to reach an agreement, because at that time the political atmosphere was very tense, so the provocation between ships could easily ignite the incidents in the high seas. The provocative incident occurred when US naval vessels met with USSR naval vessels on the high seas. The incident model that occurred in the Sea of Japan between the US and the USSR (in the Cold War era), is very similar to the incident in the South China Sea, between China and other claimant states or between China and third-party SLOCs users in the region (in the present era). For instance, maneuvering ships that endanger each other.[26]
2. Propose to make Standard Exercise Procedure (SEP) or Exercise Procedure Document (Exprodoc) which will be used together by all participants. Thus, procedures, limits, and parameters of exercise activities can be determined. This document is a legal basis that can be used as an umbrella if something happens that does not match the matters that have been agreed together previously.
3. Since there is no underlying exercise document for the implementation of this exercise, it is advisable to carry out the Table Top Exercise (TTX) only, without Field Training Exercise (FTX) at sea.
[1]Declaration On The Conduct Of Parties in The South China Sea, available at http://asean.org, accessed March 11, 2018.
[2]ASEAN To Step Up Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism, To Conduct Inaugural Maritime Exercise with China, available at http://mindef.gov,sg, accessed March 11, 2018.
[3]The-Kuang Chang. (1991). China’s Claim of Sovereignty over Spratly and Paracel Islands: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 23 Case Western Reserve Journal International Law. PP 403. Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol23/iss3/1, accessed April 1, 2018.
[4]Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (1975). White Paper on the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) Islands, Saigon. PP 4-5.
[5]Rosen, Mark E. (August 2014). Philippine Claims in the South China Sea: A Legal Analysis, A CNA Occasional Paper. PP 19. Available at: http://www.cna.org/can_files/pdf/IOP-2014-U-008435, accessed April 1, 2018.
[6]Roach, J. Ashley. (August 2014). Malaysia and Brunei: An Analysis of their Claims in the South China Sea, A CNA Occasional Paper. PP 15. Available at: http://www.cna.org/can_files/pdf/IOP-2014-U-008434, accessed April 1, 2018.
[7]Ibid, PP 35.
[8]Government of Indonesia, “Note by Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations,” (8 July 2010). Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/idn_2010re_mys_vnm_e.pdf, accessed on April 1, 2018.
[9]Available at https://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC, accessed on April 2, 2018.
[10]Available at https://www.g20.org/en/g20/what-is-the-g20, accessed on April 2, 2018.
[11]Rahul Mishra and Irfa Puspita. (November 2010). Indonesia-China relations: Challenges and Opportunities, IDSA Issue Brief. PP 4. Available at: http://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/136917/IB_China-Indonesia.pdf, accessed April 3, 2018.
[12]The Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and China (the ACFTA Agreement) was signed in November 2002. The ACFTA Agreement included provisions on economic co-operation and identified areas for cooperation. Available at: http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-china-free-trade-area-2, accessed April 4, 2018.
[14]Available at http://presidenri.go.id/maritim/indonesia-sebagai- poros-maritim-dunia.html, accessed April 2, 2018.
[15]Booth, Ken. (1977). Navies and Foreign Policy, London: Croom Helm. PP 15.
[16]Available at http://www.businessinsider.com/biggest-navies-in-the-world-2018-4, accessed April 12, 2018.
[17]Minutes of Meeting of the 1stNavy to Navy Cooperation Talks between The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy and Indonesian Navy, Beijing, 28 February 2013.
[18]Joint Statement U.S.-Indonesia Bilateral Defense Discussions (USIBDD), Training and Exercise Working Group, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, January 19, 2017.
[19]The 3rdAustralia-Indonesia Joint Operations and Exercise Sub-Committee (AUSINDO JOESC) Meeting, Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC), Australia, April 12, 2016.
[20]Available at http://www.komodoexercise.id, accessed April 2, 2018.
[21]Confidence-Building Measure, in international relations, an action that reflects goodwill toward or a willingness to exchange information with an adversary. The purpose of such measures is to decrease misunderstanding, tension, fear, anxiety, and conflict between two or more parties by emphasizing trust and limiting conflict escalation as a form of preventive diplomacy. Available at: http://www.britannica.com/topic/confidence-building-measure, accessed April 4, 2018.
[22]Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/world/asia/indonesia-south-china-sea-fishing-boat.html, accessed April 26, 2018.
[23]Available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdfaccessed April 21, 2018.
[24]Available at http://www.businessinsider.com/biggest-navies-in-the-world-2018-4#1-north-korea-976-ships-10, accessed April 2, 2018.
[25]INCSEA is a Code of Conduct formulated by the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War era in 1972, with the official name “Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Precepts of the Soviet Union High Seas and the Air Space above them”
Available at https://www.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm, accessed April 24, 2018.
[26]Junnola, Jill R. (May 1996). Maritime Confidence Building in Regions of Tension, The Henry L. Stimson Center Report No 21. PP 4-5. Available at: https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Report21-web_1.pdf, accessed April 26, 2018.
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